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Abstract—Uniform marginal pricing cannot generally support
competitive equilibrium solutions in markets with non-convexities,
yielding surplus sub-optimality effects. Previous work has iden-
tified non-convexities associated with the generation side of elec-
tricity markets and proposed different approaches to address sur-
plus sub-optimality. This paper extends this concept to incorpo-
rate the demand side. Non-convexities of flexible demand (FD) are
identified, including options to forgo demand activities as well as
discrete and minimum power levels, and resulting surplus sub-op-
timality effects are demonstrated through simple examples and a
larger case study. Generalized uplift and convex hull pricing ap-
proaches addressing these effects are extended to account for FD
non-convexities. Concerning the former, generalized uplift func-
tions for FD participants are proposed, and a new rule is intro-
duced for equitable distribution of the total surplus loss compensa-
tion among market participants. Regarding the latter, it is demon-
strated that convex hull prices are flattened at periods when FD is
scheduled to eliminate surplus sub-optimality associated with the
FD ability to redistribute energy requirements across time.
Index Terms—Convex hull pricing, electricity markets, flexible
demand, generalized uplifts, surplus sub-optimality.
NOMENCLATURE
A. Indices and Sets
Index and set of time periods.
Index and set of generators.
Index and set of FDs.
Subset of continuously-controllable FDs.
Subset of fixed-cycle FDs.
Index of steps of the cycle of FDs , running
from 1 to .
Index of iterations.
Operating constraints set of generator .
Operating constraints set of FD .
B. Variables
Vector of electricity prices MWh).
Vector of power outputs of generator (MW).
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Vector of commitment statuses of generator .
Vector of power demands of FD (MW).
Binary variable expressing whether the activity of
FD is forgone ( if it is forgone,
otherwise).
Vector of binary variables expressing whether
FD is active at ( if it is active,
otherwise).
Vector of binary variables expressing whether
the activity of FD is initiated at (
if it is initiated, otherwise).
Vector of uplift parameters associated with
the power output of generator at MWh).
Vector of uplift parameters associated with
the “on” commitment status of generator at
h).
Vector of uplift parameters associated with
the “off” commitment status of generator at
h).
Vector of uplift parameters associated with
the power demand of FD at MWh).
Uplift parameter associated with forgoing the
activity of FD .
C.Constants
Vector of total inflexible demands (MW).
Benefit associated with the demand activity of FD
.
Minimum power limit of FD at (MW).
Maximum power limit of FD at (MW).
Energy requirement of the activity of FD
(MWh).
Earliest initiation period of the activity of FD
.
Latest termination period of the activity of FD
.
Duration of cycle of FD (h).
Power demand of FD at step of its cycle
(MW).
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D. Functions
Cost function of generator .
Benefit function of FD .
Profit function of generator .
Utility function of FD .
Generalized uplift function of generator .
Generalized uplift function of FD .
I. INTRODUCTION
I N markets with non-convexities, uniform marginal pricingcannot generally support competitive equilibrium solutions
[1]–[10]. In other words, individual market participants’ surplus
maximizing self-schedule given the marginal prices determined
by the centralizedmarket clearing problem, is not generally con-
sistent with the schedule calculated by the latter. In cases of such
inconsistencies, the centralized schedules entail lower surpluses
than self-scheduling, with this difference termed as surplus loss
and the related effect as surplus sub-optimality. This effect is
undesirable on the basis of allowing all self-interested market
participants to determine independently their position given the
prices, and not by central intervention.
A wide literature has identified non-convexities associated
with the generation side of electricity markets, including bi-
nary (on/off) commitment decisions, fixed and start-up/shut-
down costs, minimum stable generation constraints, and min-
imum up/down times [2]–[10]. As demonstrated in this litera-
ture, these non-convexities lead to generators’ schedules incon-
sistency and profit sub-optimality effects.
Two general approaches have been explored to address such
effects. Thefirst one retains uniformpricing and attempts tomin-
imize the extent of schedule inconsistency and profit sub-opti-
mality. A primal-dual approach is proposed in [2] in order to de-
termine the electricity prices minimizing the social welfare re-
duction caused by the schedules inconsistency, while ensuring
non-negative profits for the generators. However, this approach
does not achieve competitive equilibrium at the optimal solution
of the centralizedproblem, anddoesnot guarantee zeroprofit loss
for the generators as it does not ensure recovery of opportunity
costs. In [3]–[6], generators experiencing profit sub-optimality
receive lump-sum uplift payments that compensate exactly their
respective profit loss, and the uniform marginal prices are op-
timized so as to minimize the total profit loss and thus the total
uplift payments. These minimum-uplift prices correspond to the
convex hull prices and coincide with the Lagrangian multipliers
optimizing thedualof themarketclearingproblem[4]–[6].
The second approach addresses schedules inconsistency and
profit sub-optimality by employing additional, differentiated
(generator-specific) prices. In [7], after solving the initial
mixed-integer centralized problem, authors solve a continuous
version of the latter, with the binary commitment variables
set equal to their optimal values. The dual variables of these
equality constraints yield differentiated prices for the genera-
tors’ commitment (commitment tickets), which along with the
uniform energy prices support an equilibrium solution. How-
ever, approaches in [2]–[7] entail that the total compensation
of profit loss is entirely charged to the demand side of the
market, which is thus treated inequitably. To this end, authors
in [8]–[10] propose the use of generalized uplift functions,
which include generator-specific linear and nonlinear terms and
constitute additional revenues or payments for the generators.
The parameters of these functions along with the electricity
prices are adjusted to achieve consistency for every generator
and an equitable distribution of the generators’ profit loss
compensation among the market participants.
Although the generalized uplift approach yields more equi-
table distribution of the total surplus loss compensation, it intro-
duces price discrimination among the market participants that
cannot be easily justified and may be considered nontransparent
[2]–[4]. For this reason, the calculation of these differentiated
prices in [9] is carried out through an optimization problemmin-
imizing the extent of discrimination introduced. Since the ap-
proach developed in [9] could not efficiently deal with multi-pe-
riod problems accounting for generators’ time-coupling charac-
teristics, an iterative cutting-plane algorithm for the calculation
of uplift parameters and electricity prices is proposed in [10].
Recent developments have paved the way for the introduc-
tion of flexible demand (FD) in power systems, with significant
economic, technical, andenvironmentalbenefits [11]. In thecom-
petitive environment, the realization of this potential is coupled
with the integration of FD in electricity markets [12]. Authors in
[13]–[19] have proposed different market clearing mechanisms
considering FD participation and demonstrated the impact of FD
onthemarket.However,previousworkhasnotexplorednon-con-
vexitiesandsurplussub-optimalityeffectsassociatedwithFD.
This paper identifies for the first time non-convexities asso-
ciated with the operation of FD and demonstrates their relation
with inconsistency and surplus sub-optimality effects through
simple examples and a large case study with day-ahead horizon
and hourly resolution. Both generalized uplift and convex hull
pricing approaches are extended to account for FD participation
in electricity markets. Concerning the former approach, gener-
alized uplift functions for FD participants are proposed, and a
new rule is introduced for equitable distribution of the total gen-
erators’ profit loss and FDs’ utility loss compensation among the
market participants. Regarding the latter approach, it is demon-
strated that convex hull prices are flattened at the periods that
FD is scheduled by the market clearing and self-scheduling so-
lutions to eliminate surplus sub-optimality associated with the
FD ability to redistribute energy requirements across time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
rives operational models of FD and formulates the centralized
market clearing problem under FD participation. Section III
identifies FD non-convexities and demonstrates the resulting
schedules inconsistency and surplus sub-optimality effects
through simple examples. Section IV and V detail the extension
of generalized uplift and convex hull pricing approaches re-
spectively to account for both generation and FD participation.
Section VI presents the examined case study and Section VII
discusses conclusions and future extensions of this work.
II. CENTRALIZED MARKET CLEARING UNDER
FLEXIBLE DEMAND PARTICIPATION
Based on submitted bids and offers, the market operator
solves the social welfare maximization problem (1), (2) to
determine the clearing schedules ,
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and .
A continuous version of the same problem, with the binary
variables set equal to their optimal values, is solved next to
determine the electricity prices [values of dual variables
associated with constraints (2) at the optimal solution]:
(1)
(2)
In this paper, the generators’ cost functions include variable,
fixed, start-up and shut-down costs, and their operating con-
straints’ sets include minimum stable and maximum generation
limits, ramp rates, minimum-up and minimum-down times. The
analytical formulation of these cost functions and operating con-
straints’ sets follows the model presented in [20] and is not pre-
sented here for brevity reasons.
FD participants may generally correspond to large industrial/
commercial consumers, participating individually in themarket,
or FD aggregators, representing a large number of smaller resi-
dential/commercial consumers [21]. Two different types of FDs
are considered in this paper, capturing the largest part of flex-
ible load models in the related literature: continuously-control-
lable (CCFD) and fixed-cycle (FCFD) [19]. The power demand
of an FD of the first type can be continuously adjusted between
a minimum and a maximum limit when the FD is active (i.e., its
demand is not zero). FDs of the second type involve operating
cycles which comprise a sequence of phases occurring at a fixed
order, with fixed duration and fixed power consumption, which
cannot be altered. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that a
demand activity of a FCFD corresponds to one such fixed cycle,
and that this cycle cannot be interrupted once it is initiated.
Furthermore, two different demand flexibility potentials are
considered. The first is associated with the ability to completely
forgo demand activities [22] (i.e., do not carry out the operation
of an electrical load planned by the consumers) and the second
is associated with the ability to redistribute the total electrical
energy requirements of activities across time [11]. Without loss
of generality, it is assumed that each FD participant carries out
at most one activity over the market horizon. In order to account
for the potential to forgo this activity, the benefit function associ-
ated with FD is expressed by (3); the benefit of the consumers
is zero if the activity is forgone, or otherwise:
(3)
The operating constraints set of a CCFD includes the
following constraints:
1) The total energy consumption is zero if the demand activity
is forgone, or equal to the fixed energy requirement of the
activity otherwise
(4)
2) When the CCFD is active, its power demand is bounded
by a minimum and a maximum power limit:
(5)
The operating constraints set of a FCFD includes the
following constraints:
1) The demand activity can be executed over the timewindow
determined by and :
(6)
2) The demand activity is executed (and thus initiated) at most
once during the above time window:
(7)
3) If the activity is not forgone, the demand at each
period depends on the initiation time, and
:
(8)
For the sake of generality, all FDs are assumed to exhibit
both flexibility potentials. However, straightforward modifica-
tions can be carried out to model FDs with only one of these
potentials. If for example the activity related to an FD cannot be
forgone, its respective binary variable will be forced equal to
1. Moreover, an FCFD that cannot redistribute its activity will
be modeled with .
III. FLEXIBLE DEMAND NON-CONVEXITIES AND
IMPACT ON SURPLUS OPTIMALITY
In a competitive market, generation and FD participants act as
self-interested surplus-maximizing entities, given the electricity
prices and subject to their operating constraints sets. These self-
scheduling optimization problems for a generator and an FD
are expressed by (9) and (10), and the resulting optimal sched-
ules by and respectively:
(9)
(10)
According to Section I, and given are not gener-
ally consistent with and , respectively. In cases of such
inconsistencies, and generally entail lower surpluses than
and , respectively, with this difference termed as surplus
loss. The surplus loss for a generator , an FD and the total
surplus loss are respectively expressed by
(11)
(12)
(13)
A wide literature has identified non-convexities associated
with the generation side, yielding inconsistency and surplus sub-
optimality effects (Section I). In this section, FD participants are
examined from the sameperspective. Thefirst FDnon-convexity
is associated with the potential to forgo demand activities and is
mathematicallycapturedbythebinarydecisionvariables .
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The relation of this non-convexity with inconsistency and
surplus sub-optimality effects is demonstrated through a
single-period problem, where the market includes 1) an FCFD
with , MW, and only able
to forgo its activity, and 2) a generator with a cost function
and without any non-convex characteristics.
Centralized market clearing involves carrying out the FCFD
activity, since is higher than the generation cost incurred
to satisfy the demand of this activity ( 100), and thus yields
MW and MWh. However, given
this price, the FCFD would choose to forgo its activity, since
its payments are higher than its benefit
; therefore, under the centralized solution,
the FCFD incurs a utility loss of 50.
Let us now neglect the potential to forgo the activity and
only consider the ability to redistribute the activity across time.
FCFDs still have a non-convex operating constraints’ set, since
their demand during their scheduling window
can only take a set of discrete values, including 0 and the fixed
power requirement of each step of their cycle.
A two-period problem is considered here, where the market
includes 1) an FCFD with , ,
and , i.e., the FCFD can carry out its activity
at either or , 2) inflexible demands with
MWand MW, and 3) the same generator with the pre-
vious example. Centralizedmarket clearing schedules the FCFD
activity at in order to flatten as much as possible the
total demand profile and minimize the total generation costs,
and thus yields MW, , MWh
and MWh. However, given these prices, the FCFD
would choose to carry out its activity at since this period
exhibits a lower price; therefore, under the centralized solution,
the FCFD incurs a utility loss of 48.
CCFDs with redistributing ability also exhibit a non-convex
operating constraints’ set, since their power demand can take
the values and but not any value in
the range . A two-period problem is also considered
here, where the market includes 1) a CCFD with
MWh, MW, MW,
2) the same inflexible demands with the previous example, and
3) the same generator with the previous examples. Centralized
market clearing schedules the CCFD activity entirely at in
order to flatten as much as possible the total demand profile and
minimize the total generation costs, and thus yields
MW, , MWh and MWh. How-
ever, given these prices the CCFDwould choose to be scheduled
entirely at since this period exhibits a lower price; there-
fore, under the centralized solution, the CCFD incurs a utility
loss of 48.
If the same problem is considered with ,
the optimal centralized solution flattens completely the total de-
mand profile with MW, MW and
MWh. Given these prices, any feasible solution of
the CCFD’s self-scheduling problem—including its above cen-
tralized schedule—is an optimal one, and therefore the CCFD
does not incur utility loss. It can be thus concluded that FDs’
non-convexities associated with their ability to forgo activities,
as well as discrete and minimum power levels yield schedules’
inconsistency and utility sub-optimality effects.
IV. GENERALIZED UPLIFTS UNDER FLEXIBLE
DEMAND PARTICIPATION
The generalized uplift functions employed in [8]–[10] con-
stitute additional revenues or payments for
the generators and include generator-specific linear and non-
linear terms. The parameters of these functions are adjusted so
that generators’ new or augmented self-scheduling is consistent
with the centralized solution. Along with these parameters, the
electricity prices are suitably adjusted to new values , to en-
sure that the (inflexible in [8]–[10]) demand side contributes at
a desired level to the compensation of generators’ profit loss.
This adjustment is carried out through an optimization problem,
minimizing the extent of discrimination introduced by the dif-
ferentiated pricing terms (thus denoted as theminimum discrim-
ination problem in the rest of this paper). In this section, this ap-
proach is extended to account for the FD non-convexities pre-
sented in Section III.
In [10], the generalized uplift function (14) applying
to generator includes a set of adjustable generator-specific
parameters associated with the
power output, the “on” commitment status and the “off” com-
mitment status of generator , respectively:
(14)
In the same vein, we propose a generalized uplift function
(15) applying to FD . It includes a set of adjustable FD-specific
parameters associated with the power input
and forgoing the activity of FD , respectively:
(15)
Given the above uplift functions, the augmented self-sched-
uling optimization problems involve the maximization of the
augmented profit of generator (16) and the augmented utility
of FD (17):
(16)
(17)
The objective of minimizing the discrimination introduced by
the differentiated pricing terms is expressed by theminimization
of the square norm of uplift parameters [9]:
(18)
The minimum discrimination problem includes the following
constraints:
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1) The solution of the centralized market clearing problem is
identical to the solution of the augmented self-scheduling
problems for all market participants (19), (20):
(19)
(20)
2) Conservation of monetary flow within the market should
be satisfied, meaning that the market operator is revenue
neutral. This imposes that the total revenues collected by
the consumers are equal to the total payments paid to the
generators, including the uplifts (21). The combination of
(21) with (2) implies that the sum of uplifts should be zero
(22):
(21)
(22)
3) The difference between a participant’s surplus under aug-
mented self-scheduling and self-scheduling without uplifts
determines the contribution of this participant to the com-
pensation for the total surplus loss [9] and is expressed by
(23), (24), and (25) for generator , FD , and the inflex-
ible demand,1 respectively. This contribution should not
be negative to ensure that participants do not derive ex-
ceptional surplus from the uplifts and the new electricity
prices; in other words, under augmented self-scheduling,
each participant should derive at most their maximum sur-
plus under self-scheduling without uplifts [9]:
(23)
(24)
(25)
The combination of (2), (11)–(13), (19), (20), and (22)–(25)
yields (26), which expresses the fact that the total surplus loss is
equal to the total compensation contribution by all participants:
(26)
The market arrangements should generally facilitate an equi-
table distribution of the compensation for the total surplus loss
among the participants. In this context, authors in [9] proposed
two market rules: 1) the total compensation is divided equally
among generators and (inflexible) demand and 2) the ratio be-
tween profit under augmented self-scheduling and self-sched-
uling without uplifts is set equal for all generators. Given that
an equitable compensation distribution between generators, FDs
1Given that the benefit of inflexible demand is not considered in this paper,
strictly speaking, its contribution is not expressed by the difference between its
surplus under augmented self-scheduling and self-scheduling without uplifts,
but by the difference between its respective payments.
and inflexible demand cannot be determined unambiguously, in
this paper we propose an extended version of the latter market
rule, where the ratio between surplus under augmented self-
scheduling and self-scheduling without uplifts is set equal to a
common value for all generators, FDs and in-
flexible demand2 (27)–(29):
(27)
(28)
(29)
Substituting (27)–(29) into (26) yields
(30)
Along with the condition , is calculated as
(31)
Equation (29), along with the assumption that the electricity
price is uniformly increased across all periods of the market
horizon [9], fixes the new electricity prices according to (32):
(32)
In order to solve the minimum discrimination problem, the
optimal solutions and of the augmented
self-scheduling problems need to be analytically expressed in
terms of the uplift parameters and new electricity prices, so as to
enforce the equal schedule conditions (19), (20). As discussed in
[10], such analytical derivations are impractical for multi-period
market clearing problems accounting for participants’ time-cou-
pling characteristics. In order to address this challenge, authors
in [10] proposed an iterative cutting-plane algorithm for the so-
lution of the minimum discrimination problem, and proved its
convergence and optimality. This algorithm iteratively restricts
the feasible set of uplift parameters through the sequential gen-
eration of surplus cutting planes, to impose indirectly schedules
consistency. This algorithm has been extended in this work to
compute the uplift parameters of both generation and FD partic-
ipants; since this extension has not created particular challenges,
the algorithm is not presented here for brevity reasons.
V. CONVEX HULL PRICING UNDER FLEXIBLE
DEMAND PARTICIPATION
As discussed in Section I, the convex hull prices mini-
mizing the total surplus loss coincide with the Lagrangian mul-
tipliers optimizing the dual problem (33) of the market clearing
2In the same line as the previous footnote, strictly speaking, the ratio does
not relate the surplus under augmented self-scheduling and self-scheduling
without uplifts in the case of inflexible demand, but its respective payments.
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problem, where is the dual function and is the Lagrangian
function (34) of the problem:
(33)
(34)
Given that the Lagrangian function constitutes an additive
combination of the individual participants’ surpluses, the dual
problem is decomposed to the independent surplus maximiza-
tion sub-problems (9), and (10), coordinated
iteratively by a update algorithm until is maximized. The
penalty-bundle method [23] is employed in this paper for this
update, due to its favorable convergence performance with re-
spect to alternative, sub-gradient methods.
In [5] and [6], where the case studies are carefully designed
such that the duality gap of the market clearing problem is zero,
this iterative algorithm terminates when the norm of the de-
mand-supply imbalances is lower
than a pre-specified tolerance. In order to address the general
case where the duality gap is not necessarily zero and the op-
timal dual solution does not necessarily satisfy the demand-
supply balance constraints [24], the algorithm terminates when
the absolute difference in the dual function value between two
consecutive iterations is lower than a pre-specified tolerance :
(35)
According to [3]–[6], after the convex hull prices have
been determined by the above dual optimization problem, gen-
erator and FD experiencing surplus sub-optimality receive a
lump-sum uplift and , respectively, exactly com-
pensating their respective surplus loss:
(36)
(37)
The total compensation for the surplus loss is entirely charged
to the inflexible demand side through a negative lump-sum up-
lift balancing the positive uplifts received by the rest
of the participants:
(38)
VI. CASE STUDY
A. Input Data
The examined case study involves the demonstration of
schedules inconsistency and surplus sub-optimality effects
associated with FD non-convexities, as well as the application
of both generalized uplift and convex hull pricing approaches to
a market with both generation and FD participants, day-ahead
TABLE I
GENERATION PARTICIPANTS’ CHARACTERISTICS
TABLE II
CCFD PARTICIPANTS’ CHARACTERISTICS
TABLE III
FCFD PARTICIPANTS’ CHARACTERISTICS
horizon and hourly resolution. This study was implemented
in FICO Xpress [25] on a computer with a 6-core, 3.47 GHz
Intel(R) Xeon(R) X5690 processor and 192 GB of RAM. The
market includes 7 generation participants, with fixed costs ,
linear and quadratic parameters of their variable cost func-
tions, start-up and shut-down costs, minimum stable
and maximum generation limits, ramp-up and
ramp-down rates, minimum-up and minimum-down
times, and initial commitment status and output
given in Table I.
Furthermore, the market includes 4 CCFD participants and 4
FCFD participants able to forgo and redistribute their demand
activities, with parameters given in Table II and III respectively.
Half of the FD participants of each type can be scheduled during
night/morning hours, representing domestic FD, and the other
half during midday hours, representing commercial/industrial
FD. The minimum and maximum power limits of each CCFD
are assumed identical at every hour of their scheduling period
(and are thus denoted by and respectively) and zero
at the rest of the hours.
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Fig. 1. Inflexible demand and total demand under centralized market clearing.
Fig. 2. Comparison of total FD under centralized market clearing and self-
scheduling without uplifts.
B. Impact of Flexible Demand Non-Convexities
Under centralized market clearing, domestic and commer-
cial/industrial FDs fill the inflexible demand’s night and midday
valleys, respectively, flattening significantly the total demand
profile, as shown in Fig. 1. However, these valleys and subse-
quently the centralized prices at these periods are not completely
flattened, due to the minimum power levels of CCFDs and the
discrete power levels of FCFDs (Section III).
As illustrated in Fig. 2–5, FD participants’ self-scheduling
given the centralized market clearing prices is not consis-
tent with the centralized market clearing schedule. These
inconsistencies are associated with both demand flexibility
potentials. Considering the ability to redistribute their activities
across time, under self-scheduling, FDs concentrate at the
lowest-priced hours within their scheduling period, which
is not consistent with the centralized schedule involving an
as-flat-as-possible total demand profile (Fig. 2). This effect
is demonstrated in Figs. 3 and 4 for CCFD 2 and FCFD 6,
respectively. Under self-scheduling, the former chooses to
acquire its total energy requirements at the two lowest-priced
hours within its scheduling period (2 and 6), while centralized
market clearing schedules it at hours 4 and 6. Furthermore,
under self-scheduling, FCFD 6 carries out its cycle at hours
4–6, since this leads to lower total payments than carrying it
out at hours 3–5 according to centralized market clearing.
Considering the ability to forgo their demand activities,
CCFD 1 chooses to do so under self-scheduling, since its ben-
efit mil is lower than the lowest payment it could
Fig. 3. Comparison of demand of CCFD 2 under centralized market clearing
and self-scheduling without uplifts, and equivalent prices
faced by CCFD 2 given the calculated generalized uplift parameters.
Fig. 4. Comparison of demand of FCFD 6 under centralized market clearing
and self-scheduling without uplifts, and equivalent prices
faced by FCFD 6 given the calculated generalized uplift parameters.
Fig. 5. Comparison of demand of CCFD 1 under centralized market clearing
and self-scheduling without uplifts, and equivalent prices
faced by CCFD 1 given the calculated generalized uplift parameters.
achieve by optimally scheduling its activity within its feasible
scheduling period ( 0.189 mil). On the other hand, under
centralized market clearing, its activity is not forgone since
is higher than the extra generation cost incurred to satisfy
the demand of this activity ( 0.186 mil). This inconsistency is
illustrated in Fig. 5. The opposite case holds for FCFD 7; under
self-scheduling, FCFD 7 chooses to carry out its activity, since
its benefit mil is higher than the lowest payment
it could achieve by optimally scheduling its activity ( 0.133
mil). Under centralized market clearing however, its demand
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TABLE IV
RESULTS OF GENERALIZED UPLIFT APPROACH
activity is forgone since is lower than the extra generation
cost required to satisfy its demand ( 0.138 mil).
The generation side also exhibits inconsistencies between
centralized scheduling and self-scheduling, associated with
generation non-convexities explored in [2]–[10]. All the above
inconsistencies are translated into surplus losses, as demon-
strated in Table IV.
C. Generalized Uplift Approach
In order to address these schedules inconsistency and sur-
plus sub-optimality effects, the generalized uplift approach of
Section IV was applied. The parameter associated with the
equitable distribution of the total surplus loss compensation was
calculated as according to (31). The new elec-
tricity prices were then set according to (32) as
. The generalized uplift parameters’ it-
erative computation algorithm [10] converged after 63 iterations
and 203 seconds of computational time. As shown in Table IV,
the total compensation contribution by all participants exactly
cancels out the total surplus loss, and the sum of all uplifts is
zero.
All FD participants apart from FCFD 7 require some non-zero
uplift parameters and do not require an uplift parameter
to address their surplus sub-optimality, as their demand
activity is not forgone under centralized market clearing. On
the other hand, FCFD 7 requires only a non-zero uplift param-
eter since its demand activity is forgone under centralized
market clearing. The elimination of FD surplus sub-optimality
by the calculated uplift parameters is demonstrated by observing
the new equivalent electricity prices faced
by FD participants in Figs. 3–5.
For CCFD 2 (Fig. 3), the uplift parameters make the equiv-
alent prices at hours 2 and 4 equal to incentivize CCFD 2 to
follow the market clearing solution and self-schedule at hours 4
and 6, as now self-scheduling at hours 2 and 6 (according to the
original self-schedule of Fig. 3) does not bring additional sur-
plus. For FCFD 6 (Fig. 4), the uplift parameters make lower
than at hours 3–5 and higher at hour 6 to incentivize FCFD 6
Fig. 6. Centralized price and convex hull price.
to follow themarket clearing solution and self-schedule its cycle
at hours 3–5, as now self-scheduling at hours 4–6 (according to
the original self-schedule of Fig. 4) does not bring additional
surplus. For CCFD 1 (Fig. 5), the uplift parameters reduce sig-
nificantly with respect to at hours 5 and 24 to incentivize
CCFD 1 to follow the market clearing solution and carry out
its activity at these two hours, as now forgoing its activity (ac-
cording to the original self-schedule of Fig. 5) does not bring
additional surplus. Finally, for FCFD 7, the uplift
(reward for forgoing its activity) incentivizes FCFD 7 to follow
the centralized market clearing solution and forgo its activity, as
now carrying out its activity does not bring additional surplus.
D. Convex Hull Pricing Approach
The convex hull pricing approach of Section V was also ap-
plied with in (35). The penalty-bundle algorithm em-
ployed to solve the dual optimization problem (33) and thus de-
termine the convex hull prices, converged after 50 iterations and
82 seconds of computational time.
Very interestingly, in contrast to the centralized market
clearing prices, convex hull prices are flattened at the night and
midday valleys where the FDs are scheduled by centralized
market clearing and self-scheduling (Fig. 6). This flattening
effect eliminates surplus sub-optimality associated with the FD
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TABLE V
RESULTS OF CONVEX HULL PRICING APPROACH
ability to redistribute activities across time, as now self-sched-
uling at different valley hours than the ones determined by
centralized market clearing does not bring additional surplus.
As shown in Table V, the positive uplift received by each
generation and FD participant exactly cancels out its respec-
tive surplus loss, and the total compensation contribution is
charged entirely to the inflexible demand, through a negative
uplift balancing the positive uplifts received by the rest of the
participants. It is worth noting that total surplus loss under
convex hull prices ( 23 357) is (minimum and) significantly
lower than the respective loss under centralized market clearing
prices ( 77 632).
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has identified for the first time non-convexities
associated with different types of flexible demand, including
options to forgo demand activities as well as discrete and min-
imum power levels. The relation of these non-convexities with
schedules’ inconsistency and surplus sub-optimality effects
are demonstrated through simple one- and two-time period
examples and a larger case study with day-ahead horizon and
hourly resolution. Generalized uplift and convex hull pricing
approaches addressing these effects have been extended to
account for the FD non-convexities.
However, the critical analysis and comparison of these
two approaches has been left out of the scope of this paper.
Future work should comprehensively investigate the strengths
and weaknesses of generalized uplift and convex hull pricing
methodologies, considering both generation and FD market
participation in different scenarios for the generation system
composition and the penetration of flexible demand technolo-
gies in the future. Furthermore, the potential of combining the
minimum surplus loss property of convex hull pricing with the
equitable distribution property of generalized uplifts through a
hybrid approach should be explored.
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